25X1

20 April 1953

HOMORANDIM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SE-42, "Current Communist Tactics"

- 1. You will recall that SE-42 and 43 were laid on as provisional estimates of the range within which the Communist "peace" campaign is likely to move (SE-42), and of the probable effects of their campaign on the non-Communist world (SE-43).
- 2. SE-42 reflects the inability of the intelligence community to determine what is going on in the USSR. As a consequence, the estimates on the "peace" campaign are very tentative. Only in Moree are concessions of real consequence thought probable, and even these are not forecast with confidence.
- 3. In Germany, the range of real concession is narrow because it is believed that the Bremlin is unlikely to jeopardize Seviet control over East Germany. (General Porter, as in early estimates, affirms that the USSR may withdraw its troops from East Cormany as in the past, he stands alone on this, of, foot-note page 4.)
- 4. Other possible tectical moves are listed in paragraphs 7 and 8.
- 5. The general conclusion (paragraph 9) is that Communist policy remains unchanged (General Porter has reserved his portion on this paragraph for reasons unknown).

oting a	Appletant 1 Eptimate	IANGGGG B	

25X1

25X1

25X1

O/NE Distribution: Orig and 3 - DCI via O/DD/I 2 - AD/NE ~

1 - Mr. A.E. Smith

Approved For Release 2005/08/22: 074-RDP79R00904A000100040079-3

25X1